The global financial crisis has cast a strong light on some hitherto obscure corners of the financial world, provoking an outpouring of calls for concerted international action. "Hard law" having disappointed, can "soft law", in 
This discourse, however, is problematic at several levels. There are conceptual problems in the "soft law" discourse itself, that reveal profoundly different patterns of legal thought cutting across national boundaries. US academics appear to be struggling with definitional difficulties, 4 caught on the seesaw of law necessarily emanating from the state and judicially enforceability The English common law, a customary law to this day, is much more comfortable with more diffuse sources of law and less fixated on the state. And some continental jurists may rarely give judicial enforcement a second thought.
Secondly, recent experience, over the past decade, with some international financial standards, as both diagnostic and prophylactic tools, has been decidedly mixed, in fact, largely unsatisfactory. Looking to international standards, in their current form, particularly in the area of capital markets, as an effective means of addressing systemic failings may be unproductive.
Thirdly, the "soft law" discourse in international finance appears strangely remote from the daily grind of international commercial practice, where the discourse is largely unknown. International commercial practitioners do not much think about state authority or judicial enforcement in going about their business. Their analyses are granular; a reference to "international financial law" would evoke bewilderment, as being devoid of meaning. The efforts of international practitioners are focused on promoting effectiveness; concerns as to judicial enforcement are far down the list.
But perhaps in this disconnect between theory and practice lie clues to the normative forces at work in international financial markets, and how best to harness them.
International finance has a long history, its roots extending back centuries, even millennia, predating the "hard law" of nation state and its courts. For some comparativists, the "hard law" of rules finds its normative force, not in the state and its courts, but rather in the, for want of a better word, customary law upon which it draws.
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The more one considers the world of international finance, where commercial practice has operated for centuries in the absence of, or despite, national law, the more obvious become the outlines of financial customary law.
The proposition put forward here is that the formal regulation of financial markets is supported by a body of customary law, a lex mercatoria, a rarely acknowledged but powerful undercurrent in finance, especially in its international iteration. This lex mercatoria demonstrates persistence and continuity, stretching back centuries, and it is neither "hard" nor "soft" as is understood in the current discourse.
There are several intriguing implications to this proposition. Is it possible that the global financial crisis represented not only a failure of formal, state-led regulation, as it surely did, but also a breakdown of a lex mercatoria of finance? If that is the case, international standard setters and national regulators, both, ignore this lex mercatoria (the customs and practices of international finance) at their peril. To do so, would be to miss a true, powerful, source of normativity operating in international financial markets
Further, are international financial standard setters, in their efforts, attempting to recreate a lex mercatoria of finance? Do we need international financial standards at all, or just better lex mercatoria? Will the current waves of regulation push the lex mercatoria into hiding? Or, on the contrary, will regulatory turbulence and impasses promote the blossoming of new forms of international practices?
The first part of this paper looks to the differing patterns of legal thought which cut across national boundaries and the implications for the "soft law" discourse in the context of international financial standards. The second part of the paper examines the recent misadventures involving "soft law" international financial standards in the capital markets. The third part of the part looks at some of the characteristics of international commercial practice that demonstrative the multiplicity of normativity at work. The last part of the paper looks at international capital markets from the perspective of a lex mercatoria and the implications flowing from this.
I. Differing Patterns of Legal Thought and the "Soft Law" Discourse
Academics in the United States appear to be struggling with definitional difficulties, 6 caught on the seesaw that law must emanate from the state and be judicially enforceable.
The English common law, on the other hand, is comfortable with more diffuse sources of law, with less fixation on the state. And some continental jurists may instinctively regard judicial enforcement as less than significant in the larger scheme of things.
Formal written law, and its judicial enforcement, are imprinted on the US legal psyche.
Beyond these boundaries lies lawlessness. The dominance of written law and judicial enforcement is indicative of the two great historical sources of US law: the English common law as wrought by an 18thC judiciary and European civilian thinking of the immediate post revolutionary period.
Great deference is paid to the judiciary in the United States and procedure dominates substance. One of the finest commercial courts in the world is the Delaware Court of Chancery, which, having deliberately adopted the jurisdiction of its English counterpart in post-revolutionary days of 1792, continues, almost alone in the world, to exercise a very pure form of equitable jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the United States is also, in the European tradition, a land of written law, formal statutory law and regulation, in a way which the UK decidedly is not. In the United States, there is no aversion to written law; there is lots of it. In the view of H.
Patrick Glenn, this constitutes the "particular genius" 7 of the US legal system, "its constructive combination of elements of both civil and common law. remained at the surface, readily observable, resulting in the characterization of the United States as a "common law" jurisdiction.
But is it really? The US legal system is certainly unlike others found in the Commonwealth. 9 According to Glenn, in "many respects US law represents a deliberate rejection of common law principles, with preference being given to more affirmative ideas clearly derived from civil law. These were not somehow reinvented in the United
States but taken over directly from civilian sources in a massive process of change in adherence to legal information in the nineteenth century."
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Like that of France, the US legal system is the product of revolution, symbolizing a break with what came before. In the case of the United States, the legal system and the state are conjoined twins, born together and inextricably linked by the Constitution.
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The US seesaw, balancing formal legislation against judicial enforcement, is apparent in much of the modern US-influenced discourse on law and development, for example. In large measure due to the geo-political forces at work, the period subsequent to the breakup of the former Soviet Union saw a massive transplantation of US-style legislation in Central Europe and East Asia. 12 When this "good law", this legislation, proved ineffective (or did not behave quite as expected), there were immediate calls for better judicial enforcement (and training of the judiciary to do it).
In the United Kingdom, statutory law, written law, has traditionally been a second best solution, a last, uncomfortable, resort, representing a failure of the common law. The prospect of codification is even more chilling in the UK, giving rise to atavistic visions of guillotines and burning barricades. Arguably, all this has changed, at least superficially, with the entry of the UK into the European Union and the massive realignment of English statutory law to the dictates of Brussels.
9 Except, perhaps, for Canada which has been subject to the beneficent influences of the Napoleonic Code through Quebec, and later direct statutory and judicial influences from the United States itself. 10 Glenn, supra note 6, 248. 11 One might say that, ultimately, all law in the United States is constitutional law. 12 A similar wave of US style legislation crashed upon former combatant countries in the Asia-Pacific after World War II.
These different patterns of legal thought are at the heart of the trans-Atlantic debate of the last decade as to the superiority of one or the other of two different approaches to financial regulation, rules-based or principles-based. It also explains the popularity in the UK of "voluntary" codes of commercial behaviour (and the difficulty of transplanting them elsewhere) and "comply or disclose" as a regulatory technique. 13 Principles-based regulation and voluntary codes of conduct, however, do not operate in a vacuum in the UK; they derive their normative and operational force from common, but non-statutory, understandings of commercial behaviour. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the FSAPs, conducted on a country by country basis using various international standards, were asking the wrong questions or failing to interpret properly the information collected.
The widespread adoption of these international financial standards with their top down approach and riddled with assumption, and their use as indicators of potential financial instability, should have been put into serious question by this financial crisis. The promotion of simplistic, high level, "solutions" to complex and deep-rooted structural problems in various parts of the global financial system is a search for a "quick fix", and doomed to failure.
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The financial crisis though raised serious doubts as to the utility of these exercises and painfully highlighted the ineffectiveness of the FSF. As Arner and Taylor point out, the crisis put into question the international "soft law" approach and the workings of "policy networks."
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Implementation of the FSF agenda focused primarily on the use of the FSAP, the financial sector assessments conducted by the IMF in developed economies, and jointly by the IMF and The World Bank, in developing economies. The mandate was to identify "vulnerabilities" in financial systems, on a country by country basis, with a view to 17 With the benefit of hindsight, of course, there were the prescient few who saw it coming. "The banking world ignored Gillian Tett when she predicted the credit crisis two years ago", Laura Barton, On the Money, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 31, 2008; available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/31/creditcrunch-gillian-tett-financial-times (last viewed August 11, 2010). 18 "Admittedly, the G20 has entrusted the Financial Stability Board with the mission of monitoring the standard-setting activity and has mandated the Basel Committee, IOSCO and the IAIS (among others) with the task of developing new rules. However, this choice seems more a quick-fix than a sustainable strategy. It will neither preserve state unity on the international stage, nor solve the issues of circumvention of national and regional democratic processes." Id. at 108. 19 Id. at 4.
nipping financial crises in the bud. In particular, priority was to be given to systematically important countries. The FSF identified 12 international standards to be used in the process of "benchmarking" or "rating" a financial system. Nevertheless, the data accumulated was impressive; the difficulty has been that it cannot be used in a narrow, scientific way, given its deficiencies. Rather, it needs a kind of qualitative interpretation which has not always been possible. Some of the observations, with hindsight, appear spot on. Iceland was identified as vulnerable as far back as 2002.
The importance of supervision and risk assessment of large, complex financial institutions was also recognized early on. Difficulties with some of the standards, such as
Financial Regulation and Supervision
Banking Inadequate integration of the results also diminished their relevance. As the "ratings" of countries on various standards began to circulate publicly, it became possible for 23 The IOSCO Objectives and Principles were not designed to identify systemic risk; rather, until the recent amendments in June 2010, they focused on traditional, one might even say outdated, investor protection mechanisms and market regulation institutions.
countries to "game" the system, by enacting legislation or adopting measures that would "tick the boxes" without necessarily being of any effect.
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As well, the voluntary nature of the FSAP process was problematic. In reacting to criticism that it did not see the global financial crisis coming, the IMF identified the failure of the US to volunteer for an FSAP as a major factor. 27 The US, for its part, had justified its objections to participating in the FSAP, by invoking the heavy burden such an assessment would place "on the scarce resources of the [IMF]".
28
The essentially domestic focus of the FSAP process has also been singled out for criticism. Although "contagion" had been at the heart of the Asian financial crisis which led to the creation of the FSF and the FSAPs, the FSAP process ignored cross-border IMF to distil common cross-country messages from the various FSAP exercises would be welcome".
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The difficulties associated with execution of the FSAP program were exacerbated by the assumptions operating below the surface of some of the international standards. Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition , and capital formation". 34 Criticism of the IOSCO Principles is not, in any way, to suggest that IOSCO itself has been a flawed initiative. Quite to the contrary. IOSCO has been a resounding success. Its significance to international capital markets has been growing by leaps and bounds and its members increasingly convinced of the importance of its mission. IOSCO saw the crisis coming and continues to produce topical and informed reports on a wide variety of timely issues, the eight new principles are different ("regulation" has dethroned both the "efficient market" and "self-regulation"), thus creating certain internal tensions within the enlarged set of principles But the IOSCO Principles, old and new, remain at the heart of the FSAP exercise. Which brings us back to contagion and predictability. The FSF and the FSAPs did not address contagion issues. Neither did they predict the global financial crisis. They were asking the wrong questions, looking in the wrong directions and, blinded by the glare of international standards, failed to appreciate the complexity and diversity of financial markets and the problems posed by their regulation.
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III. International Commercial Practice and Soft Law
The experiences of the last fifteen years have demonstrated the difficulties associated with the use of international financial standards. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the debate itself as to the "soft law" nature of international financial standards may be simply beside the point. Certainly, different legal traditions demonstrate different levels of openness and receptivity to international norms which do not derive from state authority and are not subject to national judicial enforcement. The problems associated with international financial standards may stem, not from their "soft law" nature, but rather from their substance and sources: assumption riddled, reheated national law from which are forged into top-down, one-size-fits-all "international" standards. This is not how the world of international commercial law and finance operates and may explain why the "soft law' discourse in international finance appears so strangely remote 35 The financial industry too seems prepared to welcome an approach which is less reliant on top-down, assumption-riddled, one-size-fits-all international standards. "When everyone is suffering from what appears to be the same shock, the desire to implement a co-ordinated response is high, and because of that desire, the ability is stronger. When everyone is starting to recover, the desire to co-ordinate is inevitably lessened, and as a result it will be more difficult. Luckily, this is probably a good thing….G20 members and their leaders have been very wise in the past 12 months. The G20 creation itself is a fantastic development. But let's not require it always to have its members do the same thing at the same time. However, as a precautionary measure, the entire stack of contractual documentation was carted off to the national assembly of Laos and enacted into "law", a somewhat symbolic gesture more than anything and readily accomplished in a one party state. The point to note here is the redundancy and recourse to multiple forms of normativity, characteristic of international finance. Little store is set by formal legislation or enforcement by the courts. Like those tiny ships setting sail from European ports in the sixteenth century in quest of faraway fortunes, the entire endeavour is fraught with uncertainty and is an exercise in calculated risk taking. The objective of all concerned is a practical one; to make it work.
There appears to be a huge chasm between the gritty world of international finance in action and the lofty realm of international financial standard setting. But perhaps in this disconnect between theory and practice lie clues to the normative forces at work in international financial markets. The more one considers the world of international finance, the more obvious become the outlines of centuries old customs and practices, an international merchant law, the ghostly outlines of the lex mercatoria 38 The Government of Laos was a party to many of the contracts and acted in various capacities.
Where sovereigns are involved, the use of their domestic law, at least notionally, is often required.
IV. International Capital Markets and the Lex Mercatoria
A. What is lex mercatoria
Interest in lex mercatoria as a subject of intellectual inquiry waxes and wanes; it is a notoriously slippery concept, with numerous, divergent meanings. Some dispute its existence 39 but the "romance" of the law merchant, 40 a phrase coined by Wyndham
Bewes in 1923, continues to casts a powerful spell according to Hatzimihail. 41 There are several generally cited operative concepts traditionally attributed to the lex mercatoria:
harmony and equitability, mutual confidence and good faith, the binding force of ordinary undertakings (oral contracts) of merchants, self-regulation deriving from its own needs and experiences, expediency and expeditiousness. 42 Goode points to the certainty and consistency of practice, reasonableness, notoriety and co-normativity with mandatory law. 43 And, lex mercatoria, having preceded the nation state, was inherently international, or perhaps a better word would be, anational.
Ralf Michaels has recently provided a useful summation of the some of the various senses in which the term has been used. 44 He looks at lex mercatoria in its linear, chronological manifestations. The "ancent lex mercatoria" of the Middle Ages was a "transnational set of norms and procedural principles established by and for commerce in (relative) autonomy from states". 
B. The Persistence of the lex mercatoria
Interestingly, it is the "ancient" lex mercatoria, in the sense of " a transnational set of norms and procedural principles established by and for commerce in (relative) autonomy from states", that shines through the workings of modern international capital markets.
The notion of "self-regulation" for example, which is enshrined in the IOSCO Principles, can be traced straight back to medieval guilds and the City of London.
The City of London and Self Regulation
It is not an accident that self-regulation of financial institutions and intermediaries has found its strongest expression, at least until recently, in the United Kingdom.
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Even well into the 19thC, the financial center of the United Kingdom and, arguably the world's most important international financial center, was the City of London, usually 47 Id. 44 49 The United States inherited it from the UK in pre-revolutionary times, and it persisted through the centuries as it served the interests of iinance well.
simply referred to as "the City". 50 The 'that the special customs of the City shall prevail against the general law of the land'".
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Customs which can face down acts of Parliament are powerful indeed, so it should not be surprising that vestigial, and perhaps not so vestigial, elements persist in the City of 50 The City of London is a geographically defined area and a corporation dating back to the 12thC. "The Guildhall body, though nominally the Corporation of London, are restricted both for good and evil within the small space of 600 acres, and to a population of about one-tenth of the whole Metropolis of London". 
The Case of Oral Contracts
The use and recognition of oral contracts is another characteristic of a lex mercatoria.
The nudum pactum, ie the contract without formalities, did not exist in Roman law but was, in the interests of commercial expediency (and the generalized illiteracy of the age), Commercial contracts may be proven more simply than ordinary, or "civil", contracts.
Ordinary (civil) contracts for over Euro1500 must be made in writing 56 , which now includes electronic forms of writing. 57 Commercial contracts are exempt from this requirement with article L110-3 of the Code de commerce providing that commercial agreements may be proven by any means unless otherwise provided by law. 58 By way of contrast, the later German civil code (Bürgerliches Gestzbuch or BGB) posits a universal principle of consensual contract and the commercial code does not need to 54 The City of London Corporation Inquiry, id., recounted perceived abuses associated with the autonomy of the City. "The present members of the Corporation of London…seem to have imbibed the notion that in order to divert a reform of the present system, and the substitution of one which should really serve the purposes of a Metropolitan municipality, it would suffice to urge that there is no ground for the imputation of 'moral turpitude or personal corruption'." This was in contradistinction to their predecessors in the eighteenth century where "[h]eavy tavern expenses were allowed, the cause of charity and education was neglected, and publicity avoided". sometimes resulting in unintended indiscretions (but which only reach the light of day in the event of a major blow-up).
The global financial crisis was obviously a blow-up of major proportions. It exposed the inward workings of the swaps and derivatives markets, among others. But lesser scandals, such as the current one over the manipulation of LIBOR 71 , also illuminate market practices which usually operate unknown to the general public. In particular, in the LIBOR scandal, the pivotal role of "voice brokers" came to light.
Computers and Bloomberg terminals dominate trading floors, but the human element remains a crucial feature of transacting across derivatives and other parts of the global financial system. This is no better illustrated than by the presence of so-called "voice brokers" who act as middle men for banks trading swaps and other fixed income securities in financial centres that link Asia, Europe and the US. Autonomy from the state, ie. self-regulation, and the legitimacy, perhaps even the imperative, of oral contracting are both characteristics of pockets of modern finance.
And although the nature of self-regulation in finance and the purposes to which oral contracts are put have mutated over the centuries, the outlines of the "ancient" lex mercatoria persist. 83 A resurgence of interest in legal pluralism, the recognition that In his fascinating study of diamond merchants 84 in New York City, 85 Barak Richman investigates how it is that a diamond merchant will hand over hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of diamonds against a promise to pay at a later date, essentially a sale on credit. What precludes industry participants from taking advantage of these "extraordinarily lucrative opportunities...to cheat"? 86 The diamond industry, like other specialized areas of finance, spans centuries and continents. 87 The New York Diamond Dealer Club is modelled on centuries old
European diamond bourses, with their trading rules, membership requirements and mandatory industry arbitration. 88 Diamond merchants have "systematically rejected use of public courts and state created law to enforce contracts and police behavior." Have the efforts to create international financial standards been an attempt to "fix" or reinvent a lex mercatoria of finance? But by drawing on state, legislative and regulatory 91 Id., [ ]. 92 The "old" Wall Street demonstrated similar characteristics. Interestingly enough, the institutional structure and characteristics of the financial firms was mirrored in the elite Wall Street law firms which serviced them. The lawyers were drawn from a small circle of elite law schools and constantly interacted with each other. Prior to the internet, transactions were negotiated and structured by means of endless conference calls. Oral undertakings and agreements with respect to deal structure and documentation were scrupulously observed. 93 Liar's Poker, [1987] . There is much explanatory force in viewing international capital markets from the perspective of a lex mercatoria. A better understanding of the normative forces at work, lex mercatoria being among them, can point to better ways of providing oversight and imparting integrity to the international markets.. As Gunther Teubner has noted, lex mercatoria may be "soft law" , but it is not weak law.
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94 As cited in Berger, supra note [44] 
